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THE COMMENCEMENT ORATOR
The gentleman selected to deliver the
Baccalaureate Address at the coming Com-
mencement of the Law School, is Hon.
Gustav A. Endlich, LL. D., of Reading,
Pa.
Judge Endlich, a graduate of Princeton,
of the class of 1875, was admitted to the
Berks County Bar in 1877. Five years
thereafter, at the age of 26, he published
"The Law of Building Associations," a
work whose fulness and accuracy have
secured'it avery-highiplace. Two years
later came from the same pen "The Law
of Affidavits of Defence." The next year
were published. -two volumes of "Wood-
ward's Dbcisions," and three years after
that, "Commentaries on the Interpreta-
tion of Statutes."
For five years ending in 1894, Judge"
Endlich was the editor of the Criminal
Law Magazine,. although, having been
elected Additional Law Judge in 1889, he
had to take his share of the large business
before the courts of Berks. He has-de-
livered lecturesibefore Law Schools, the
State Bar Association and other lesrned
bodies. In,1898.he received from Muhlen-
berg College, the degree of LL. D., an
honor which his high character, excep-
tional learning, literary skill, and public
services had abundantly merited. In 1899
his first term as judge being about to ex-
pire, he was renominated by both the
Democratic and Republican parties of
Berks county and elected without op-
position for a second term of ten years.
There are no more learned lawyers in
the State of Pennsylvania, than is Judge
Endlich, and but few, if any, in the United
States.
It is pleasant to add that he is an in-
corporator of our School, and from the
first'has been its steadfast and loyal friend.
We are heartily glad that we shall have
the honor and pleasure of seeing and hear-
ing him in June.
THE COLLEGE BANQUET
The annual college bauquetheld in As-
sembly Hall on the evening of the 20th,
brought together about 200 of the under-
graduates, every member of the college
faculty and many of the alumni, living in
the vicinity of Carlisle. It was a spirited,
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and impressive gathering. Class, frater-
nity and faculty lines were cast aside and
every person met on a common basis.
College songs, college yells, class songs and
class yells, followed at intervals, and each
was given with enthusiasm. These along
with the decorations, and the large crowd
added to the impressiveness of the oc-
casion.
- Dr. Reed gracefully performed the func-
tion of toastmaster, and the following re-
sponded to toasts: Rev. J. A. Lippincott,
D. D., Philadelphia; Dr. B. 0. McIntire,
of the College Faculty; Hon. J.M.Weakley,
of the Law School Faculty; Miss Wright,
Messrs. Leib, Baker, Smith and Cunning-
ham of the college; Sherbine, Flynn and
Barnhart of the Law School; and Mr. Am-
thor of the Preparatory School. Sherbine
spoke for the Senior class of the Law
School, Flynn for the Middle class and
Barnhart for the Junior class.
The following students of the Law
School were present: Hillyer, Patterson,
Wilcox, Keller, Hamblin, Cook, Wolfe,
Lanard, Houck, Vera, Hubler, Mowry,
Peightel. Fox, Barnhart, Sherbine, Flynn,
Bishop, Claycomb, J. R. Jones, Henraleke.
SCHOOL NOTES
The Senior class has begun to make ar-
rangements for the coming Commence-
ment Exercises. At a recent meeting, com-
mittees were appointed, and other pre-
liminary arrangements were made. Be-
fore the adjournment of the meeting,
President Bishop appointed the following
committees:
Programmes and Invitations - Fox,
Boughton, Core and Gerber.
Music-Joues, Miller, Drumheller and
Delaney.
Caps and Gowns-Ebbert, Phillips, Clay-
comb and Hickernell.
Hall and Ushers-Gross, Walsh, Dever
and Williamson.
Phillips of the Senior class was in Chi-
cago on legal busiuess during part of the
month.
The Middle class will receive three
months' instruction on Blackstone, cover-
ing in that time the first and second books
of the eminent jurists' works. Professor
McKeehan, who will have charge of the
subject, has announced that the courne
will be begun in a few weeks, when the
class has finished the subject of agency.
The last of the series of mid-winter
dances conducted by the Comus Club, was
held in the Armory, Tuesday evening,
Feby 24. An unusually large crowd was
present.
The lecture of Win. Jennings Bryan in
the Carlisle Opera House on the evening
of Feb. 23d, brought together a crowd
that filled the house to its doors. The
lecture was conducted under the auspices
of the college Y. M. C. A., and was the
first of a series to be given during the
coming Spring.
Mr. Bryan was met at the station by
the entire student body who extended him
an enthusiastic reception. They followed
him to the residence of Dr. Reed, whose
guest he was while he was in towp, and
refused to leave until Mr. Bryan made a
short address.
The subject of the lecture was, "A Con-
quering Nation." It was a discussion of
the great questions being considered by
the American people, taxation, trusts, the
conquest of the Philippines and the money
problem. Within the two hours of the
lecture he discussed these questions with
an eloquence that won frequent applause.
Senator Calpin of Lackawanna county.
was a guest of Fleitz and Benjamin of the
Middle class during the fore part of the
present month.
Clifford D. Jones entertained his sister
and Miss Densmore of Ebensburg for
several days during the present month.
The following Law students attended a
reception at Irving college, Mechanics-
burg, on the evening of the 21st: Wilcox,
Kress, Sherbine, C. D. Jones and Lloyd.
The Allison Society has elected the fol-
lowing officers to serve for the next three
months:
President-Wilcox.
Vice President-Hillyer.
Secretary-Yocum.
Executive Committee - Burkhouse,
Schwarthopf and McDonald.
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AMONG THE ALUMNI
In the recent municipal compaign in
Scranton two of the alumni of the Dickin-
son Law School, T. A. Donahoe, '02, and
W. W. Johnson, '01, participated promi-
nently. The former was secretary and the
latter assistant secretary of the Democratic
city committee. These are positions of
prominence and responsibility, it being
necessary for the persons holding them to
carry out the details of the campaign.
This year that part of the campaign re-
quired men of more than ordinary energy
and executive ability, for it was the first
election in the city, under the Ripper Bill,
for a Recorder, and the Democratic party
having carried the city in the two last
county elections, its leaders, in the city,
planned a vigorous city campaign. To
conduct it, they selected only men upon
whom they could rely and in whose ability
they had confidence. The appointment of
Johnson and Donahoe gave general satis-
faction.
Valentine and Hess, both members of
the class of '01, who are in partnership in
Wilkes-Barre, were recently appointed at-
torneys for a newly organized corporation
the purpose of which is to give instruction
in various branches by mail. Hess was
one of its incorporators. He is also one of
its directors. The business of the corpo-
ration will be conducted in Wilkes-Barre.
Thorne and Kern, the former a member
of the class of '01, and the latter of '02,
were in town during the past month for
several days.
Jay D. Creary of last year's Middle class,
was recently admitted to the Bar in
Seattle, Wash.
Hon. L. P. Holcomb '01, a member of
the present Legislature was in town during
the present month.
Ed. Rogers who was a member of the
present Senior class in its first year and
who left here to enter the University of
Minnesota, was recently elected captain
of the foot ball team of that institution
for next year. During the year that he
was in the Law School here, he was cap-
tain of the Indians' foot ball team. He
also played second base on their base ball
team.
Frederick A. Marks '01 was recently
elected president of the Central Luther
League of Reading and vicinity. He is a
resident of Kutztown, Pa., and has estab-
lished there a lucrative law practice. For
several years he participated prominently
in the League work. His election to the
presidency of that body was a recognition
of his service in its interest.
EUGENE D. SEIGRIST OF THE LAW
FIRM OF SEIGRIST AND MOYER,
HONORED
We take pleasure in announcing the
election of Eugene D. Seigrist, Esq., to
the Common Council of the city of Leba-
non, from the first ward.
Recently Mr. Seigrist and Gabriel H.
Moyer, of Palmyra, entered into a partner-
ship as a law firm and opened offices at
No. 773 Cumberland St., Lebanon, Pa.,
with a branch office at Palmyra, Pa.
Both gentlemen are graduates of the
Dickinson School of Law, and are known.
as bright energetic and able young at-
torneys. Since their graduation they have
become popular throughout the county of
Lebanon and have taken an active part in
Republican polities.
The election of Mr. Seigrist is indication
of the fact that his sterling qualities are
appreciated by his constituents.
MOOT COURT.
THOMAS' ESTATE.
Post-nuptial contract- The confideNial re-
lation of marriage imposes the utmost
good faith-There must be a full disclos-
ure of Property.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
John Thomas and Sarah Giles, the for-
mer 60 years, the latter 28 years, married.
Thomas owned $10,000 of personal proper-
ty and laud worth $25,000, and Giles $20,
000 of personalty and land worth $20,000.
Both were childless, though previously
married.
Six months after marriage, they agreed,
In writing, each to renounce all right, at
the death of the other, in the estate of the
deceased.
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Two years after, there being no material
change in the estate of either, John died.
His widow, Sarah, commences partition
to have dower assigned.
His heirs obtain a rule to show cause
why the petition should not be dismissed.
The evidence shows that Sarah Giles was
not aware of the size of Thomas's estate
and did not know that he owned any land.
Thomas made no disclosures to her as to
his estate.
On the other hand, he was ignorant
that she owned anything, and supposed
that she was without property.
JAMES and LOURIHER for the rule.
The promise of the husband was a good
and valuable consideration for the promise
of the wife. Duffy v. The Insurance Co.,
8 W. & S. 434.
All that the law requires is that the pro-
vision for the wife be reasonable and pro-
portional to the means of the husband.
Kline's Estate 64 Pa. 123 ; Ludwig's Ap-
peal, 101 Pa. 535; Turman v. Bunn., 92
Pa. 250.
HoucK contra.
The statutory capacity of a feme covert
t qinakecontracts does not extend to con-
taats geberally between husband and
xVife. Ua'rried woman's act of 1893; Oden-
welder's Appeal, 1 Supreme Court 345;
Bran q3ory's Appeal, 156 Pa. 628.
to miake such an agreement valid there
must be the utmost good faith between the
parties a~d a disclosure of every essential
fact necessary to intelligent action. Weeks
gaa1{as.. 3W. & S.520; Bispham's Equity,
p. 230 to 23; Darlington's Appeal, 86 Pa.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
'he only question at issue in this con-
tritversy is the validity of a post-nuptial
eax~trae, made between John Thomas and
11.g wis Sarah, who now claims to take
thp interest in his estate, which in the ab-
sence of such agreement, is secured to her
by law.
Parties to contracts of this nature are not
like the ordinary contractors dealing at
arms length; they stand in a confidential
relation demanding the utmost faith. And
where the parties have such a confidential
relation as exists between husband and
wife, the court will look upon their con-
tracts with jealousy and solicitude, and if
it appears that the slightest advantage
was taken or deception practiced, relief
will be given to the injured party. In a
long line of well adjudicated cases, the
principle is laid down that the provision
made for the wife, in order to bar
dower, must not be unreasonably dispro-
portionate to the means of the husband.
What provision was made for Mrs.
Thomas? He knew nothing of her sepa-
rate estate. On the other hand, he sup-
posed that she was without property. He
knew that he was worth considerable
property. Notwithstanding, he sought to
cut her out of a share in his estate, and by
means of this agreement, leave her at his
death, for all he knew or cared, dependent
upon the charities of the world. We fail
to discover any consideration except, in
case he survived her, which was highly
improbable, that he would renounce all
right to her estate. This was not such a
provision as would bar her right of dower.
Nor does the fact that the wife pos-
sessed an estate of her own make any
difference in the determination of the
question involved. Suppose at the time
of the making of the contract she had
made him acquainted with the size of her
estate. Would it have had any effect?
We think not. She was ignorant of the
quantity of his estate. She knew nothing
of what she was relinquishing. He did
not say one word about his estate; he did
not honestly, openly and fairly lay before
her the true state of his property, which
the law requires. Kline's Estate, 64 Pa.
122; Bierer's Estate, 92 Pa. 265; Shea's
App., 121 Pa. 302. And when his repre-
sentatives call upon a court to sustain a
contract of this kind the burden is upon
them to follow the proof of the contract
by sufficient affirmative evidence that it
was her voluntary act,jand not induced
by undue influence exerted upon her.
Darlington's App., 86 Pa. 521; Kreiser's
App., 69 Pa. 198; that no advantage was
taken of the copfidential relation; that
there was no concealment of a material
fact; that the contract was executed by
the wife with a full knowledge of its pro-
visions and their effect. Shea's App., 121
Pa. 302. And if they fail to show that the
husband performed his whole duty, equity
will treat the transaction as one of con-
structive fraud and set it aside. Kline's
Estate, 64.Pa. 124.
In Campbell's Appeal, 80 Pa. 298.
Thompson, C. J., said "The- authorities,
as also the reason of the thing, seem to
teach that without an actual execution of
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a post-nuptial settlement by an irrevo-
cable effectual transfer of the property
settled, the wife will not be bound if she
does not choose, and is never bound by
a mere promissory consideration. I have
not been able to find a single case in
which a wife has been decreed to perform
a post-nuptial executory contract at the
instance of the representatives of her hus-
band." The contract in the case at bar is
very like the one in the case cited above,
and is therefore not binding upon the wife
unless she choose to be bound.
For the reasons assigned we, therefore,
discharge the rule and further decree that
dower be set out.
WILLIS, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The theory that husband and wife were
one person, never expressed the legal
facts. The elaborate principles regulating
their relation implied a recognition of
their duality. If the husband murdered
her, he was not supposed to kill himself;
and an assault by him on her, was not
considered a self-flagellation. The time
never was, in the history of the common
law, when the wife was not regarded as a
woman, and the husband as a man, and
when third persons dealing with one of
them, were treated as ipso facto dealing
with the other. Inaccurate thinkers de-
lighted to chatter about the unity of hus-
band and wife in one person, pretty much
as in another sphere of thought, men
scribbled and talked about the unity of
two beings of different species in one per-
son.
The legal fact now is, at all events, that
a man is one person and his wife is another,
and that she, as well as he, can make
valid contracts, and, further, that she can
make valid contracts with him.
We are to inquire whether the particu-
lar contract of Mrs. Thomas with John,
her husband, is to be enforced.
It is first suggested, as reason for treat-
ing it as void, that there is no sufficient
consideration. Is it really so? John's es-
tate, at the time of making it, consisted of
$35,000, of which $10,000 was personalty.
Mrs. Thomas' estate, at the same time, was
worth $40,000, of which $20,000 was per-
sonalty. If the estates continued as they
were, Thomas by the contract renounced
$20,000 of personalty absolutely, and a
life estate in $20,000 worth of land. Mrs.
Thomas renounced $5,000 of personalty
and a life estate in $12,500 of land. These
figures.do.not suggest a'wan t of considera-
tion.
We are reminded that John Thomas did
not know that his wife had any property,
and that he supposed that she owned
nothing. What follows? He did not
think that he was sacrificing anything,
but she knew that he was sacrificing agood
deal. Whether she received an adequate
consideration or not, if it depends on
opinion, depends on her opinion. She re-
nounced a share in his estate because she
knew that he was renouncing a share in her
considerable .estate. Surely the sacrifice
she knew that he was making, was sub-
stantial consideration for her making a
reciprocating sacrifice. How can she be
hurt by the erroneous opinion of her hus-
band that he was sacrificing nothing,
when she knew that he was sacrificing
much?
We are prepared to concede that if in
fact what she was giving up was grossly
disproportionate to what he was giving
up, if e. g. he was worth $2,000,000 and
she only $40,000, the disparity would
strongly move a chancellor to annul the
transaction. This disparity does not
exist.
It is suggested that John Thomas did
not act ingenuously towards her. The
court will not annul a contract because
of a want of frankness and explicitness on
his part, but only when it is convinced
that she has been or may have been mis-
led by them into a:contract which, in
fact, is disadvantageous to her. We must
advert here to the circumstance that it is
he who suffers, and not she, by the want
of openness. She did know that she had
some estate, but did not know that he had
ony real estate. He supposed that she had
nothing lat all. Why did she not tell
him? Did she owe no wifely duty of ab-
solute disclosure of her circumstances to
him? Or, by some singular freak of the
law, was it simply for him to tell her all
about his circumstances? We cannot see,
in the conduct of this woman, that she
was one of those confiding, self-forgetting,
all-abnegating creatures, whom the courts
have chivalrously taken under their es-
pecial patronage. If John was shrewd,
IOI
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Sarah was shrewder. If John loved his
next of kin more than Sarah, Sarah was
not behindhand, in loving hers more than
John. The fact is that Sarah seems to
have been abundantly able to take care of
herself, to meet craft with craft and con-
cealment with concealment.
It is urged, again, that no consideration
has actually passed, except the exchange
of promises. Is that a quite fair statement
of the fact?
The parties, having made the contract
lived for two years. During these years,
Sarah had for her estate its protection.
She had bound John not to claim any
part of it. It is only when he is dead,
that she discovers that she has had no
consideration but a promise. Similar
complaints are sometimes made by people
who have insured their houses or barns
in mutual companies, and who, after the
expiration of their policy, are asked to
make payments on their premium notes.
They think they are suffering a shocking
hardship in having to pay for nothing!
But they are not paying for nothing.
They have had the protection of the policy
for one, two, five years, and they ought to
pay for it. So, Sarah's estate has been
for two years shielded from the risk of
her dying first, and of John's claiming a
large slice of it, to the detriment of her
next of kin, whom, apparently, she cared
for more than for him. And now that the
two years are over, and the risk is no
more, she has the temerity to suggest that
she received no consideration but a
promise. Had she died first, I ween that
her kin would have been eager enough to
maintain the integrity of the contract.
But now that it can be of no further use
to her, she thinks she can kick it aside,
and take from her husband's estate what
she solemnly promised not to take. The
suggestion is made that the contract was
not separately acknowledged. We know
not whether it was or not. But even if it
was not, and would therefore be invalid
as to the land of her husband, it would
not be invalid as to his personalty. A
wife can surely make contracts concerning
personalty, without a separate acknowl-
edgment. However, it would be better
to concede that the reciprocal renuncia-
tions were intended to affect both land
and personalty, and not either without
the other, and to hold that if the contract
is not valid as to the land, it will not be
valid as to the personalty, because it would
no longer express the intention of the
parties. The contract is virtually a re-
lease of dower to the husband. Such re-
lease must doubtless have been acknowl-
edged at the time at which this was made.
For this reason alone, we agree with the
learned court below that the agreement is
void. Campbell's Appeal, 80 Pa. 298. We
have examined the cases cited by the
learned counsel, but have not deemed it
necessary to cite them.
Appeal dismissed.
HENRY GRUBB vs. MANUFAC-
TURING COMPANY.
Master and servant-Dscharge of servant
before the end of the .period for which he
was hired-Right of president to dis-
charge when board of directors were
satisfied with the service of the servant.
The company, by its president, em-
ployed Grubb, Jan. 1, 1900, for one year,
at a salary of $25 per week, as a salesman,
Grubb agreeing to do his work in a faith-
ful manner and to the company's satis-
faction. In three months he was dis-
charged by the president of the company,
in the face of the opposition of the direc-
tors, who were entirely satisfied with him.
The president declared, as his reason for
the dismissal, that he was not attentive to
customers, nor alert or agreeable. Evi-
dence tended to prove that a private busi-
ness difficulty between them was the cause
of the discharge. The court entered a
non-suit, on the ground that the plaintiff
was not satisfactory to the president.
WILLIS and YEAGLEY for plaintiff.
When the facts are disputed the ques-
tion of whether there was sufficient ground
for dismissal is for the jury. Wilke v.
Hannon, 166 Pa. 202. In all cases the dis-
satisfaction must be real and not intended,
and must be honestly entertained in good
faith. Daggett v. Johnson, 39 Vt. 345;
Singerly v. Thayer, 108 Pa. 291.
CHAPMAN and EBBFRT for defendant.
When the facts are undisputed, the
question of whether there was sufficient
cause for dismissal is for the court.
Elliott v. Wanamaker, 155 Pa. 67;
Remuxter v. Huber Co., 196 Pa. 580.
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OPINION OF THE COURT.
Suit was entered in this case because
the plaintiffs work was alleged not to
have been satisfactory to the president
of the defendant company. The presi-
dent, as agent of the company, employed
the plaintiff, as salesman, upon the con-
dition that he do his work in a faithful
manner, and to the satisfaction of the com-
pany.
The president declared that he dis-
charged the plaintiff because he was not
attentive to customers, nor alert or agree-
able. On the other hand, there was evi-
dence that tended to prove that a private
business difficulty between them was the
cause of dismissal. There is no doubt that
the president, by virtue of his office, had
the power to discharge, if done for suffi-
cient reason and in the interest of the
company. But, whether the plaintiff
performed his duties as salesman, is dis-
puted and undetermined and should have
been left for the jury. The doctrine of
Elliott v. Wanamaker, 155 Pa. 67, that
what is sufficient ground for dismissal, is
a question of law for the court, the facts
being undisputed, does not apply in this
case; for the facts are, in this case, dis-
puted, and ought to have been left for the
jury.
The declaration of the president that the
plaintiff did not perform his duties in a
proper manner; and the other evidence
that the directors were satisfied with the
plaintiff and that it was a business diffi-
culty between him and the president that
caused his dismissal, are contradictory in
terms. In Dixon v. Daub, 17 Sup. 168,
the court said: "There is in every case
triable by jury a preliminary question of
law for the court. Whether or not there'
is any evidence from which the fact
sought to be proved may be fairly inferred;
if there is, it is sufficient to send the case
to the jury, no matter how strong the
proofs to the contrary." The plaintiff in
this case, claimed commissions as agent
of defendant. Defendant denied their
agency, alleging that they acted as mere
volunteers and without authority.
Whether or not plaintiffs were agents of
defendant, was held to be a question for
the jury. This is also supported by 122
Pa. 494. Non-suit is set aside.
J. M. PHILLIPS, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
We regret that in the consideration of
this case we receive so little aid from the
learned court below. Its opinion was
manifestly written under an extreme
sense of the value, for other purposes, of
its time, and of the irksomeness of inves-
tigation, reasonably thorough enough to
guide it or us to a sound conclusion. Its
result, after so meager and superficial an
examination, could, if correct, be so, only
by an accident.
There are three distinct questions in
this case. Was Grubb dischargeable by
the company, on his failing to perform
his work to the company's satisfaction?
Did he fail to perform it to its satisfaction ?
Was he discharged by it?
Grubb agreed "to do his work in a faith-
ful manner and to the company's satisfac-
tion," and he was thereupon employed by
it for one year at a salary of $25 per week.
This agreement makes a condition subse-
quent, so that if at any time within the
year, Grubb should fail to perform his
work in a faithful manner, or to the com-
pany's satisfaction, the obligation of the
company to retain him, and pay him
would cease at its option.
"Faithful manner" appeals to an objec-
tive test. The defendant could not be the
sole judge of it. A want of faithfulness
must be expressed in the conduct of
Grubb; his want of punctuality, his ab-
sences, his indifference to being agreeable
or accommodating towards customers. We
think it was to be presumed that Grubb
had performed in a "faithful manner,"
until evidence to the contrary was pro-
duced. It would have been error to non-
suit him, before such evidence was ten-
dered by the defendant, Grubb having
shown no unfaithfulness in the manner of
his performance, if the right to dismiss
Grubb depended on this unfaithfulness.
Grubb agreed, however, "to do his work
* * to the company's satisfaction," and
it appeared at the trial, that the president
of the company had discharged him on the
ground that he, the president, was dissatis-
fied with him. The president, it was
shown, had declared, as his reason for dis-
missal, that Grubb was "not attentive to
customers, nor alert or agreeable." The
plaintiff submitted evidence tending to
prove that a private business difficulty be-
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tween him and the president, was the cause
of his discharge. Should this evidence
have been submitted to the jury? We
think it should.
The discharge might have been because
of this business difficulty. That would
have produced dissatisfaction in the presi-
dent's mind. But, (a) it would not
have been dissatisfaction with Grubb's
"work." Grubb was to "do his work" to
the company's satisfaction. He might
have done it thus, and might have been
discharged for a personal reason. The
court could not properly hold that the
mere act of discharge was the proof of the
president's want of satisfaction with his
work. (b) The president's dissatisfaction
springing from extra-corporate relations
between himself and Grubb, could not
be deemed the company's dissatisfaction.
The president's state of mind, as officedr,
and arising from his interest in the
corporation, might be considered as the
company's state of mind, but his state of
mind having no relation to his function
as officer could not be imputed to his com
pany. If he was dissatisfied with Grubb
because of a private quarrel, that dissatis-
faction could not be deemed the dissatis-
faction of the company, the common em-
ployer of both. One question to be decid
ed then, was whether such want of satis-
faction, on the president's part, as led him
to dismiss Grubb, was dissatisfaction with
Grubb's "work." The court could not as-
sume, as it did, in entering a non-suit,
that-it.was.
But, suppose the jury should find that
the president-was not satisfied with the
"work," and that'his want of satisfaction
was the company's. Would that alone
have justified the discharge? We think
it would. It is to be noted that we dis-
tinguish between being dissatisfied with
the work, and being dissatisfied with some-
thing else than the work. If the company
was 'dissatisfied with him, because his
family did not buy'its goods from it, be-
cause he did not attend the same church
as the directors, because he voted the
Democratic ticket, etc., etc., and not be-
cause of his mode of performing the work
for whichihe.had been employed, it would
have had no right to end his'employment
before the expiration of the year. When
however the-dissatisfaction with the work
is real, (bonafide, to use an expression of
some of the cases), then the company may
discharge him. It is not necessary that
in addition there should appear to other
minds, e. g. to a judge, or to jurors, facts
without which in their opinion there ought
to have been satisfaction. The employer
may be dissatisfied, when others think
that he should not be, but he is what he
is, and when he stipulates that the em-
ployment shall not continue when his satis-
faction ceases, courts are not to say that
such a stipulation is void. A man has a
right to contract for his own satisfaction.
Singerly v. Thayer, 108 Pa. 291. In Seely
v. Welles, 120 Pa. 69, a reaper was alleged
to have been sold. The buyer furnished
evidence that the agreement was that "if
it worked to suit me, and my team could
handle it satisfactorily on my land, I
would buy it; otherwise I would not, and
I told him I was to be thejudge." It was
error for the trial judge to tell the jury
that if this was the understanding, the
defendant need not pay "provided you
find that the machine did not work well,
and that he had reasonable cause to be dis-
satisfied with it." "His objections to the
reaper," says the Supreme Court, "may
have been ill-founded, indeed they may
have been in some sense unreasonable in
the opinion of others, yet, if they were made
in good faith, he had a right, if his testi-
mony is believed, to reject it. Ifhe wanted
a machine that was satisfactory to him-
self, not to other people, and contracted in
this form, upon what principle shall he be
bound to accept one that he expressly dis-
approved ?"
The same principle has been applied to
a contract for a suit of clothes, Brown.v.
Foster, 113 Mass. 136; for a bust of a de-
ceased person, Zaleski v. Clark, 44 Conn.
218; for an organ, McClure v. Briggs, 58
Vt. 82; to an employment of a man to
superintend fur-cutting, Koehler v. Buhl,
94 Mich. 496; or of a man as an agent,
Tyler v. Ames, 6 Lans. 280; or of a man to
write weekly for a newspaper, Crawford
v. Mail & Express Co., 163 N. Y. 404.
Of course, as we have already suggested,
the question remains to be decided by a
jury whether the defendant was in fact
dissatisfied with the work, or simply pre-
tended to be, some other cause having in-
duced him to discharge the plaintiff. Some-
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times, the acceptableness of the work, as of
a bust, or suit of clothes, depends so much
on the idiosyncrasies and tastes of the
customer, that his declaration of dissatis-
faction, (in the absence of other evidence,
e. g. contradictory declarations, retaining
and using the article, etc.), must be de-
cisive. In other cases, the total absence
of any objective ground for dissatisfaction
may be a proof that the dissatisfaction was
simulated. It is the actual, not the pre-
tended or asserted dissatisfaction, that
justifies the discharge; Smith v. Robson,
148 N. Y. 252; Duplex Safety Boiler Co.
v. Gardner, 101 N. Y. 387. The question
always is, however, was the employer
really dissatisfied with the work?
The directors of the company were en-
tirely satisfied with Grubb. The presi-
dent, itis averred, was dissatisfied. Whose
state of mind is to be deemed that of the
corporation? Grubb was to do his work
"to the company's satisfaction." It is to
be noted that Grubb was employed by the
president; he was discharged by the presi-
dent, and he has by this action, treated
himself as discharged by the corporation,
for he has brought his suit against it. He
seems to concede that the president had
the power to employ and to discharge.
That being so, we think the president was
understood to represent the company in
judging the existence of grounds for dis-
charge. His pleasure employed Grubb,
his displeasure must be the cause of the
discharge of Grubb. The president is
selected with a view to his fitness to super-
intend the employes, and judge their fit-
ness. The directors do not hire them;
are not presumed to know whether they
are competent or not. In the absence of
further evidence, as to the arrangements
in this corporation, and in view of the
plaintiff's recognition of the president's
representing the corporation in the dis-
charge of plaintiff, we think the president
was the person whose satisfaction or dis-
satisfaction was to be deemed that of the
corporation.
The individual directors, not acting in
session, have no power to bind the cor-
poration. No deliberation on the retention
of Grubb. at any meeting, is shown, no
resolution that he was satisfactory and
ought to be retained. It is the integral
opinion of the board, not that of the
several components, that could pretend to
be the opinion of the corporation.
If the board had the power of retention,
and was to judge the cause of dismissal,
and to dismiss, Grubb has not in fact been
dismissed. He should have gone to his
work, and he would possibly have found
that, as the directors claimed the power
to retain, they furnished to him work to
do, and stood ready to pay him his com-
pensation. Instead of this, Grubb seems
to have acquiesced in the president's de-
cision, and he has sued the corporation on
account of it.
While the court did right in setting
aside the non-suit and granting another
trial, we find no indications that, at the
second trial, the principles above enunci-
ated were recognized. Had the question
been submitted in proper form, the result
might have been different.
Judgment reversed with v. f. d. n.
COMMONWEALTH vs. HARTZELL.
Criminal law-Indictment for maintain-
ing apig-sty-Nuisance-Plea of autre-
fois acquit-Motion in arrest of judg-
ment.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Hartzell was indicted for maintaining a
nuisance in supporting a pig-pen in Car-
lisle, and was acquitted. He continued to
maintain a pen for a year in the same
state as before when he was indicted again
for the same nuisance. When he was
first indicted, there were four residences
within one hundred rods of the pen.
Since then, ten dwelling houses have been
erected within forty rods of the pen, and
the highway near the pen is much more
travelled than formerly. Hartzell pleads
autrefois acquit and not guilty. The
above facts have been found specially by
the jury, under the first plea. Under the
second, he has been found guilty. Motion
in arrest of judgment.
JACOBS and Yocum for the plaintiff.
The plea of autrefois acquit is a com-
plete defence whenever the evidence shows
the second offence to be the same transac-
tion as the first. Com. v. Conner, 9
Phila. 592; 4 Yeates 68; 70 Pa. 68; 12
S. and R. 391 ; 28 Pa. 14; 13 Mass. 455.
A pig-sty is not a nuisance per se. Price
v. Gaulf, 118 Pa. 403 ; 54 Pa. 401 ; 84 Mich.
38; 61 Wis. 500.
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SMITH and WILLIS for the common-
wealth.
Under the plea of autrefois acquit, the
two offences must be identical and is a
question of fact for thejury. McCleary v.
Com., 29 Pa. 323; Coin. v. Conner, 9
Phila. 591; State v. Ingraham, 96 Iowa
278.
An offensive trade or business carried
onin a public place is a nuisance. Wier's
App, 74 Pa. 241; 57 Pa. 274; 130 Pa. 546;
139 Pa. 83; 6 Gray 474; 4 Clark 104.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
The defendant in this case owned and
maintained a pig-sty in the borough of
Carlisle.
Since his former indictment and ac-
quittal for maintaining a nuisance in form
of a pig-sty, an additional number of
houses have been built in close proximity
to his pen, and it is the inmates of these
houses that are now objecting to defend-
ant maintaining his pig-sty in its present
location.
No one would attempt to charge that a
pig-sty would, under all circumstances,
be a nuisance. It was held not to be so
when there were but four houses within
one hundred rods, but since then, with
the additional number of houses, it be
comes an entirely new proposition, and
must be viewed from a different stand-
point.
In Wier's Appeal, 74 Pa. 241, J. Shars-
wood, says: "There are many kinds of
business useful and even necessary in
every large community, which certainly
are not nuisances in themselves but
which nevertheless become so in view of
the circumstances of the neighborhood in
which it is proposed to establish them."
There is always a distinction to be ob-
served between a business long established
in a locality, which ha.s become a nuisance
from the growth of population and erec-
tion of dwellings in proximity, and that
if a new erection, threatened, in such a
vicinity; nevertheless the rule is plainly
laid down : "That. carrying on an of-
fensive trade for any number of years in a
place remote from buildings and public
roads, does not entitle the owner to con-
tinue it in the same place after houses
have been built and roads have been laid
out in the neighborhood to the occupants
of which and travelers upon which it be-
comes a nuisance." As the city extends
such nuisances should be removed to the
vacant grounds beyond the immediate
neighborhood of the residences of the
citizens. "This public policy as well as
the health and comfort of the population
of the city demand." Rhodes v. Dunbar,
57 Pa. 274. Wier's Appeal, 74 Pa. 231.
It is argued that "when defendant was
engaged in a lawful business, the injury
complained of must be more than a mere
annoyance," and "that every man has a
right to the natural use of his own
property." Price v. Grantz, 118 Pa. 403;
Kaufman v. Grieseniver, 26 Pa. 407-415.
This may be true but we are inclined to
believe, that a pig-sty under the given
circumstances, would be so offensive to
the ten persons compelled to live within
the radius of its odor that it would be
against all principles of health and sound
policy to allow it to so remain for benefit
of one and detriment of many. Brady v.
Weeks, 3 Barbour S. C. R. 159.
In Douglass v. State, 4 Wis. 387, it was
held that it is no defence to an indictment
for maintaining a nuisance by a mill dam
that was erected before any inhabitants
settled near it.
Establishments like pig-stys, not only
interfere with the health, but if they do
not reach to that, they do to the ordinary
enjoyment of the residences of inhabitants
coming within the circle of atmosphere
tinted by them, and both property and
persons may be prejudiced or injured
thereby.
The right to claim that such establish-
ments shall be prevented or removed is
the right that every citizen has to pure
and wholesome air, at least as pure as it
may be consistent with the compact
nature of this community in which he
lives. Rhodes v. Dunbar, 57 Pa. 286.
In consideration of above facts and find-
ings, we feel compelled to deny the motion
in arrest of judgment.
Motion denied.
FLEITZ, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The pig pen, for whose maintenance
Hartzel is now indicted, is the same in
respect to which he was previously in-
dicted, and acquitted. He pleads autrefois
acquit. If the nuisance now alleged, is
the same as that for which he was con-
victed, he cannot be successfully indicted
again for it. The pig pen is the same.
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But, the pen is not the nuisance. The
nuisance is the offence to persons, the in-
jury to property, of which the pen is the
cause. The offence or injury of to-day is
not that of to-morrow. The pen is con-
tinuous, the offence or injury caused by it
is continuous, but that offence or injury
at one time, is different from the offence
or injury at another time. For to-day's
there may he an action, or a prosecution.
For to-morrow's, there may be another
action or prosecution.
If in a prosecution for to-day's, certain
facts are shown to exist, and the verdict
is not guilty, the judgment is conclusive
in any subsequent prosecution for the
continuance of those facts, that they are
nota nuisance. The judgment would there-
fore bar the action.
But, a nuisance does not consist in a
structure, its state or act, but in its relation
to person and property. A pig-sty is not,
cannot be, per se a nuisance. The sty
without the pigs Is surely not. If the pigs
and the pen were thoroughly washed
every ten hours, they could hardly be a
nuiqance. So, a sty with pigs allowed to
be unwashed and extremely filthy, would
not be a nuisance, unless there were per-
sons or property of others than the owner
sufficiently near to suffer inconvenience
or harm. It may easily be that a mill or
factory when first operated is not a nui-
sance, because of the absence of persons or
property within the radius of its noises,
effluvia, etc., and that this mill or factory,
though conducted in precisely the same
way, becomes a nuisance, owing to the
entrance within the radius of such persons
or property. Thus lead works, established
at a point remote from habitation, may
grow to be a nuisance by the extension of
a city towards it. People v. Detroit White
Lead Works, 82 Mich. 471 ; Newcastle v.
Raney, 180 Pa. 546; Wier's Appeal, 74 Pa.
230; 21 Am &Eng. Encyc. 691. The jury
found, at the former trial, that defendant's
pig-sty was not a nuisance, whea there
were only four residences within 100 rods
of it. Since then ten dwellings have been
erected vithin 40 rods 6f it. The highway
near the pen is also much more frequently
traveled. It is impossible to maintain
that the acquittal under the former cir-
cumstances is conclusive that the pig-sty
Is not now a nuisance. The court below
correctly held that the plea of "autrefois
acquit" was not sustained on the special
verdict, and entered judgment of respond-
eat ouster. The plea of "not guilty" being
then put in, the same evidence as under
the plea of autrefois acquit was submitted
and the jury returned a verdict of guilty.
Despite the defendant's motion to arrest
the judgment, the court has entered judg-
ment. We see no cause for the motion.
If the evidence was insufficient to justify
rhe verdict, a new trial, and not a motion
in arrest of judgment, was the proper
remedy.
Judgment affirmed.
HOPE vs. THORPE.
Contract-Mutuality of consent-Statutory
requirement as consideration-Intention
to be bound.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Thorpe, a stranger to Hope, told him on
one occasion that he would give him one
hundred ($100.00) dollars, if he would
never swear any more, being disgusted"
with his frequent use of profahe words.
Hope impressed by the fact that his habit
alienated persons from him, made up his
mind not to "swear" any more and in fact
did abstain for nine months. Then re-
membering Thorpe's promise, Hope made
up his mind to ask for the one hundred
($100.00) dollars. Thorpe said he had not
made his promise otherwise than as a sug-
gestion and rebuke. Hope thereupon sues
in assumpsit.
YocuM and PRICKETT for the plaintiff.
If a proposal is explicit it may be assent-
ed to by acts, for acts may be as clear an
indication of intent as words can be.
Hoffman v. Railroad Co., 157 Pa. 174;
Phillips v. Alleghany Car Co., 88 Pa. 368;
121 Mass. 528; 97 N. Y. 52; 12 L. R. A.
463 ; 145 Mass. 69.
SMITH and VERA for defendant.
There was no contract, because there
was no mutual consent to be bound.
Sherman v. Kitsmiller, 17 S. and R. 45;
Powers v. Curtis, 147 Pa. 340; 7 Watts48;
29 Pa. 858 ; 165 Pa. 98 ; 166 Pa. 265.
There was no consideration because
plaintiff only did what lie was legally
bound to do. P. and L. Dig., vol. 1, p.
1123, on Blasphemy; Conover v. Stilwell,
34 N. J. L. 54; Amer: & Eng. Enc. of
Law, Vol. 6, p. 750.
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OPINION OF THE COURT.
This is an action for assumpsit for $100.
It seems that Thorpe, a stranger to Hope,
told him on one occasion that he would
give him $100 if he would never swear any
more, being disgusted with his frequent
use of profane words. Hope being im-
pressed by the fact that his habit alienated
persons from him, made up his mind not
to swear any more, and in fat did abstain
for nine months. Then, remembering
Thorpe's promise, Hope made up his mind
to ask for the $100.
Thorpe said he had not made his promise
otherwise than as a suggestion and a re-
buke. The plaintiff contends that he has
acted upon it, and has refrained from
swearing, and he is now permitted to re-
cover for this agreement, claiming nine
months is a reasonable and sufficient time.
From the facts as presented, the question
is, was there a contract or was it merely a
loose conversation, intended as a rebuke,
and as a suggestion for Hope's benefit?
It. is necessary to decide whether this
was such an assent to, and carrying out of
the contract, as would warrant a recovery.
As it is held in Thurston v. Thornton,
1 Cushing 89, that it is necessary to decide
as in this case to prove a contract, whether
the minds of the parties were in such an
assent as to create thereby a valid contract,
or whether what passed between them
was merely a loose conversation, written,
understood, or intended as a contract. A
contract implies the assent of two minds.
It must be understood betveen the parties
that one party has made an offer and the
other has accepted it.
If one party should make an offer and
no one accepts it there would be no con-
tract. There is an apparent exception,
however, where a party makes an offer to
the public, offering a reward to any one
who would do a certain act, this is to no
one in particular, but to any one who will
accept it, and it is an implied part of the
offer that time shall be given to any one
who chooses to accept iA. And if a person,
before the offer is withdrawn, does that
which by the terms of the offer entitle
him to the reward, his so acting upon the
offer constitutes an acceptance of it, and
the party making the offer is bound to ful-
fill his promise.
But when the parties are face to face to
constitute a contract, the one must offer,
and the other accept, unless where it is
part of the agreement, that time shall be
given to the person, to whom the offer is
made, to determine whether he will accept
or not, in which case the time given makes
part of the contract.
Was there a meeting of minds as to form
such an assent capable of constituting this
contract, or as contended by plaintiff, was
it merely intended as a rebuke and not an
agreement?
Was it understood, when the parties
separated, there was to be anything done
in furtherance of the agreement, or did
plaintiff refrain from swearing for his own
benefit, and not with intention of acting
upon the agreement? We do not think
there was any intention to be bound by
this offer, but that plaintiff acted upon it
for his own benefit.
Even though there was a good offer and
acceptance, it is held in Columbia Bank &
Bridge Co. v. Haldeman, 7 W. and S. 233,
that a contract made about a matter pro-
hibited by statute, is void. Therefore, the
consideration is not good, as it is held by
all courts and claimed by all text writers
that a consideration whereby one agrees
to do something, which he is legally bound
to do, is no consideration for the contract,
and renders it void. A. and E. Encyc.
vol.6, p. 750; Conover v. Stillwell, 34N. 3.
L. 54.
As the Act of Assembly of April 22, 1794,
expressly forbids the use of any profane or
blasphemous words, under penalty of fine
or imprisonment.
We do not think a cause of action will
lie in this case, as the time of performance
has not elapsed, the words, never swear
any more, which implies that until his
death, no action would lie for the per-
formance. In fact it would be necessary
for plaintiffs legal representatives to bring
the action, and not plaintiff himself.
We must therefore decide in favor of de-
fendant.
MOREHOUSE, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.
We think that the conclusion reached
by the learned court below, in this case,
was correct. If Thorpe promised binding-
ly to pay Hope, $100, the promise was not
to pay at once. He said he "would give
him (Hope) $100 if he would never swear
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any more." Hope did notaccepttheqffer,
and give his acceptance and promise not
to swear, as consideration for Thorpe's
promise. The only consideration for that
promise, was, then, not Hope's promise
never to swear, but Hope's abstinence
from ever swearing. It is no more
Thorpe's duty to perform before Hope,
than Hope's to perform before Thorpe.
Hope has abstained for nine months, but
he may yet live for nine or ninety-nine
years, and he does not perform at all, un-
til he abstains throughout his lifetime.
In this case, there can be no partial per-
formance.
No contract arose, from Thorpe's words,
unless he intended that Hope should un-
derstand him to intend one, and Hope did
so understand, or unless his words and
demeanor caused, and reasonably caused
Hope to think that Thorpe intended a
contract. The evidence of Thorpe is, that
he did not intend his words to be other
than a rebuke. Whether he did or not,
the jury should decide. And, if the jury
should find that Thorpe did not intend a
promise, they should determine whether
Hope believed him to intend a promise.
The evidence is that Hope, being hn-
pressed, not by the- promise, but by the
discredit into which his habit of swearing
was bringing him, made up his mind not
to swear. It was after abstaining for nine
months, that he remembered Thorpe's
words, and made up his mind to demand
the $100. From this evidence, the jury
might very well infer that Hope did not
understand Thorpe to have made a
promise intended to be binding. If he
did not, he could not make it binding by
his own future conduct.
It is to be regretted that the evidence is
not more explicit as to the character of
the "swearing" from which Hope has
abstained. The word "swearing" is capa-
ble of being applied to words the utterance
of which is not prohibited by statute, as
well asto those prohibited. The abstain-
ing from doing acts which there is no
legal right to do, will not be a sufficient
consideration for a promise to compensate
for the abstinence. In the absence of
evidence as to the character of the "swear-
ing" refrained from, there could be no re-
covery.
It is unnecessary to consider whether,
in order that Hope might avail himself of
Thorpe's promise, he should have notified
Thorpe of his intention to claim it. In
view of its character, the length of time
covered by the contemplated performance,
the difficulty of Thorpe's knowing
whether Hope was abstaining or not, we
think notice should have been given of
the intention to earn the$100, even though
no promise, on Hope's part, was necessary.
There are cases in which intention to rely
on a promise must be signified, and this,
we think, is one of them.
Judgment affirmed.
CITY OF BROWNSVILLE vs. THE
POWER COMPANY.
Real property-ights of riparian owners.
Injunction to restrain an upper riparian
owner from exercising certain rights re-
fused-Bight of water company to exer-
cise eminent domain.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
John Smith was the owner of a tract of
land bordering on a stream, on which tract
he had erected a grist mill, the power for
which was furnished by building a dam
across this stream and using the water
power. Subsequently, the Borough of
Brownsville built a basin and pumping
station at a point below the dam, using
the water thus obtained to supply its in-
habitants, conveying it to the city in
pipes, a distance of several miles. Smith
has just sold his mill property and water
rights in the stream to the A. B. C. Co.,
who propose raising the face of the dam
so as to obtain a greater water power and
erect on the grist mill site a plant for the
purpose of developing this power and dis-
posing of it to the highest bidder. The
City of Brownsville now asks for a perma-
nent injunction restraining the Power Co.,
on the ground that the volume of water
below the dam will be diminished by in-
creasing the size of the dam, thus impair-
ing its supply.
GERnER and Mow-vy for complainant.
A riparian owner may not use the water
running through his land for manufactur-
ing or other purposes, not incidental to the
natural use of his land. Clark v. R. R.,
145 Pa. 438; Pa. R. R. v. Miller, 112 Pa. 41;
Wheatley v. Chrisman, 2 Pa. 298. An
upper riparian owner cannot materially
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diminish the flow. R. R. Co. v. Miller,
• -pra. The damages being irreparable,
an injunction should be granted. Com-
rnonwealth v. R. R., 24 Pa. 159.
HAM LIN and KRESS for respondent.
Injunction is not the proper remedy,
no irreparable injury being threatened.
Rhodes v. Dunbar, 57 Pa. 274. Damage
can be ascertained. Harkinson's Appeal,
78 Pa. 196. The complainant is a tres-
passer inasmuch as he is violating rights
of lower riparian owners. Therefore no
injunction should be granted. Haupt's
Appeal, 125 Pa. 24. Every riparian owner
can use the water flowing through his land
even though lower riparian owners suffer
thereby. 2 Watts 327. Reasonable de-
tention of the water does not injure those
below. 12 Pa. 249.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
Whatever right the plaintiff borough
had to take the water from this stream for
the use of its inhabitants must be found
in the Acts of Assembly of April 3, 1851,
and May 25, 1887. By these acts, boroughs
are authorized "to provide a supply of
water for the use of the inhabitants," and
are given the right of eminent domain
conditioned on the payment to the owners
of property appropriated, damages for the
taking thereof. By these acts a borough
may go outside its limits for a water sup-
ply, and its rights to the water in a stream
are not measured by the rights of a riparian
owner.
The rights of a riparian owner would
not justify the plaintiff in carrying the
water for miles out of its channel to supply
the borough of Brownsville with water
if such use of the water would perceptibly
lessen the volume of the stream. We have
nothing to do with the rights of riparian
owners below the pumping station. If
they have been injured they must establish
such injury in a proper action. Our con-
cern is with the upper riparian owner, the
Power Co., which plaintiff desires to have
enjoined from enlarging a dam for the
purpose of increasing the power of the
plant. In Haupt's Appeal, 125 Pa. 211, it
was held that "although the plaintiff has
a right to appropriate the stream and has
appropriated it, the rights of upper ri-
parian owners are not extinguished. The
complainant has not made compensation
for them, and defendant has yet the power
to exercise them."
Every owner of land through which a
stream of water flows, is entitled to the
use of the water, and to have the stream
flow in its natural and accustomed course,
without diminution, diversion or cor-
ruption. The right extends to the quality
as well as the quantity of the water. To
this rule there are some well established
exceptions. Every riparian owner has
the right to the use of the water passing
over his land for his ordinary domestic
purposes, and may use all the water if all
is required. A second exception is the
right to cofifine and dam back a stream
for the purpose of generating power. In
the present case the mill was located on
the stream prior to the establishment of
the pumping station. It is held in Hoy
v. Sterrett, "that the mere prior occupation
of a stream of water for the purposes of a
mill will not vest such an exclusive right
in the occupant as to enable him to main-
tain an action against a person who erected
a mill and dam above his, by which the
water is in part impeded and he is in some
degree injured thereby. Every riparian
owner is entitled to use the flow of the
water through his land, although the
owner of a mill below may be in some
measure injured." It is earnestly con-
tended by plaintiff that confining the
water is not a use incidental to the land.
However, this may be, it is a use and a right
which has been recognized and held
reasonable by the courts in Hoy v. Sterrett
supra, and Hartzell v. Sill, 12 Pa. 248. The
establishment of a pumping station did
not prevent defendant from using the
water in a prudent manner as it flowed
through defendant's property. The right
of defendant to construct a dam and use
the water in a reasonable mariner for
generating power being established, and
no compensation having been paid to de-
fendant for this right, it is clear that de-
fendant cannot be enjoined from building
the dam. Since the City of Brownsville
has the right of eminent domain, their
proper remedy would be by condemnation
proceedings, by which defendant would
be compensated for the loss of his right to
build a dam.
Bill dismissed.
PEIGHTEL, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The City of Brownsville, we must assume,
owns, is lessee of, or otherwise has a right
to, the basin and pumping station on the
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stream below the dam. It is therefore to be
deemed a lower riparian owner, and as
such, has a right to use the water of the
stream, and, in consequence, has a right
that no upper riparian owner shall, by his
acts, interfere with this use.
If the upper riparian owner is threaten-
ing by means of permanent arrangements
to interfere with this use, the City is not
limited to the action of trespass for the
vindication of its right. It may ask and
obtain an injunction, without first securing
a judgment at law. Scheetz's Appeal, 35
Pa. 88; Jennings Bros. & Co. v. Beale, 158
Pa. 283, [taking away coal from land];
Duffield v. Hue, 136 Pa. 602; Alleson v.
Evans, 77 Pa. 221 [taking away oil]; Me-
Callum v. Germantown Water Co., 54 Pa.
40 [polluting water by a factory]; Raupt's
Appeal, 125 Pa. 211; Shenandoah Com-
pany's Appeal, 2 W. N. C. 46 [taking
water from a stream].
The important question, then is, is the
defendant, as upper riparian owner, about
to interfere with the right of the lower
owner? He can interfere with his right
by interrupting the flow, by changing its
course, by diminishing the quantity of
water flowing to the lower land, by cor-
rupting the water. The wrong suggested
by the plaintiff as impending, is the inter-
ruption of the flow, or the diminution of
the amount of water flowing, or both.
. A certain diminution of the water is per-
missible to the upper owner. So much
water as is necessary for culinary washing
or other domestic uses, for potation, for
the watering of cattle belonging to the
owner and kept on the premises, can be
taken from the stream, without regard to
its size. If it be small, these uses may
lead to, and will justify, the abstraction
of all the water. Hoffer v. Hoffer, 146
Pa. 365; Pa. R. R. Co. v. Miller, 112 Pa.
34; Clark v. R. R. Co., 145 Pa. 438.
The use must be bona fide, not of more
than reasonably necessary, nor under the
influence of any malevolence towards a
lower owner. Cf. Hoy v. Sterrett, 2 W.
327; Hetrick v. Deachler, 6 Pa. 32. All
the water in excess of what is used bona
fide for these purposes must, with excep-
tions to be noted, be allowed to flow down
the stream, for the use of the owner of the
nether riparian lands.
The use of water as a power for the
operation of grist and saw mills stands
apart from other non-domestic uses. It is
settled that the owner of an upper mill,
whether it be first or last in the order of
erection and operation, has the right to
make such use of the water as is reasonably
necessary to operate the mill. Morris v.
MeMamee, 17 Pa. 173. In doing so it may
be requisite to dam the water back two
days; Hoy v. Sterrett, 2 W. 327; three,
four, five, even thirteen days at a time;
Hetrick v. Deachler, 6 Pa. 32; Hartzall v.
Sill, 12 Pa. 248. The owner of the lower
mill has no right to operate it, at the cost
to the owner of the upper, of the non-use
of theupper. Nor has any plan of division
of time of operation between the mills,
been hit upon. It is not held, e. g. that,
when the water is insufficient to operate
both mills simultaneously, the upper mill
shall run a week or two weeks, and then
cease to run, in order that the lower mill
may run for an equal time. Nor is there
any limit to the size, and necessary power
of the mill, nor apparently, to the height
of the dam. In Hartzall v. Sill, 12 Pa.
248, it was from 10 to 12 feet high. Nor is
precedence given to a grist, as against a
saw-mill, or vice versa. The upper mill
was a saw-mill, and the lower a grist mill,
in Hoy v. Sterrett, 2 W. 327 ; Hetrick v.
Deachler, 6 Pa. 32; Morris v. McMamee,
17 Pa. 178.
As the water may be prevented for an
undefined time, (that is, so long as is
reasonably necessary to the operation of
the upper mill), from reaching the lower
mill, so any diminution which may be
incidental to this detention and use, must
be borne by the lower owner.
Water may be used for irrigation; Lord
v. Meadville Water Co., 135 Pa. 122, but
the condition upon which this use may be
made of it is that the quantity reaching
the lower owner is not, in consequence,
"materially diminished;" Miller v. Miller,
9 Pa. 74. The upper owner should not
divert the water, for this object so as to
"destroy or materially diminish or impair
the application of the water by other pro-
prietors;" Messinger's Appeal, 109 Pa. 285.
If, on account of the volume of the stream,
the quantity taken perceptibly and materi-
ally diminishes the water, a wrong is com-
mitted. It is immaterial that the lower
owner has enough for his domestic pur-
IlIl
THE FORUM
poses, or as much as he is actually wishing
to use. Miller v. Miller, supra. His right
to a materially undiminished flow is not
dependent on his own purposed or actual
use of the water.
Riparian land can be devoted to other
uses than residence, or farming, or culti-
vation of grass, or the feeding of cattle.
A tannery may be sustained upon it,
Harley v. Meshoppen Water Co., 174 Pa.
416. It may contain lead, or other ores,
and these ores may be extracted from it;
In the process, water may be needed. The
same condition applies to this use as to
that for irrigation. The owner can not
deprive the sub-riparian owner of as much
water as is reasonably necessary for the
business, because the "business might
reasonably require more than he could
take, consistently, with the rights of the
plaintiff." He can take some of the water,
but it must be without "materially di-
minishing it in quantity.2 This is the rule
applied to the extraction of lead; Wheatley
v. Chrisman., 24 Pa. 298. Generally, when
the water is used, not for "ordinary domes-
tic purposes" but "for manufacturing or
other purposes having no necessary re-
lation to his use of his land," the upper
owner must not "materially or sensibly
diminish its quantity.'
A similar principle has been applied to
railroads, which are also riparian owners.
If they take water from the stream for use
in their locomotives, they are liable to
owners of lower land, if the result is "any
essential diminution"? of the stream. Pa.
R. R. Co. v. Miller, 112 Pa. 34. "The de-
fendant company" said Clark, J., in Clark
v. Railroad Co. 145 Pa. 438, 4as a riparian
owner merely, has no right to divert the
water from its natural channel, to the
prejudice of the rights of others below it
on the stream. If the amount of water re-
quired to supply its locomotives at this
point and diverted by it from the channel
of the stream, sensibly or materially di-
minished the flow, it was bound to buy it,
or subject itself to an action for an ex-
cessive use or diversion of water. No
matter what were the necessities of the
defendant's business, it had no right to
convey the water out of its course, to the
prejudice of the plaintiff's rights. Haupt's
Appeal, 125 Pa. 211." Cf. also Railroad
Co. v. Water Co., 182 Pa. 418.
A manufacture of any sort, upon the
premises, beyond the sorts anciently com-
mon in agricultural communities, such as
grist and saw mills operated by water
power, can be conducted by a riparian
owner only under the limitation that he
does not sensibly diminish the quantity
of water flowing to the inferior lands.
The riparian owner cannot conduct the
water away from his premises, for use else-
where, if he sensibly diminishes the water.
He cannot sell it to others ; Rudolph v. Pa.
R. R. Co., 186 Pa. 541, 551.
We have just seen, that a railroad com-
pany cannot take water from the land,
even for its own use elsewhere. A water
company cannot, as riparian owner, take
to a distant village, borough, or city for
the consumption of its inhabitants so much
water that the residue reaching the lower
owners will be sensibly, materially less
than it would otherwise have been. If it
does, it will be enjoined; Haupt's Appeal,
125 Pa. 211; or trespass can be maintained
against it; Lord v. Meadville Water Co,
135 Pa. 122. And a borough, becoming
owner of land on a distant stream, has, as
such, no more power than a water com-
pany. Haupt's Appeal, 125 Pa. 211.
The bill alleges that Smith had erected
a grist-mill and across the Stream a dam.
This, as riparian owner, he had a right to
do. It is not alleged that he had detained
more water than it was reasonably neces-
sary to detain, in order to operate his mill.
Smith, it is alleged, has sold his mill to
the Power Company, which is about to
erect, on the grist-mill site a plant for the
development of electrical power. This
power it proposes to sell. Has the Com-
pany the right of a mill-owner, or only of
a manufacturer?
In the early days of the commonwealth,
lands were usually devoted to agricultural
purposes, and saw mills and grist-mills,
being indispensable, obtained recognition
as a class. There was no good reason for
postponing the upper mill owner to the
lower. Each miller exercised rights in
subordination to similar rights of the
superior. As we have seen, manufactures
are regarded as forming a separate class
from milling. Milling is, itself, it is true,
a species of manufacture. The shapes and
sizes of the grain or of the lumber, are
altered by it. And, in manufacture, power
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generated by the fall of water, may be
used, just as in milling. We do not think
it proper, however, to extend the privilege
of a miller, with respect to detaining water
in order to increase the water-power, to
the manufacturer. The miller has acquired
a traditional place, which cannot be
usurped by pursuers of other and more
modern businesses. It would be arbitrary
to divide a business into parts, and to
justify the consumption, or detention of
water for that part of it which consists in
the development of the power, and to re-
fuse justification to the consumption or
detention of water in the other processes.
The defendant purposes to generate
electricity, and to sell it. This is to be
treated as a species of manufacture. In-
stead of shovels, or shoes, or locomotives,
or other palpable articles, the article to be
created by the defendant is impalpable
and invisible. That matters not. If it
distinctly appeared that the defendant
was, by means of the dam, going percepti-
bly and materially to detain and diminish
the water, there would be ground for an
injunction.
The city of Brownsville, as riparian
owner, having no right to divert the water
for the consumption of its inhabitants
could, the bill averring the other proper
facts, sustain it. But, the city has the
right to take the water for this purpose,
under the statute. It does not need to
give, or secure compensation in advance.
Its own taxing power is sufficient security.
The lower riparian owners may resort to
the remedies provided, at anytime. Were
none provided by statute, the common
law action of trespass would be adequate to
secure compensation; Delaware County's
Appeal, 119 Pa. 159; Riddle v. Delaware
County, 156 Pa. 643; 3 P. & L. Dig. 3782.
Practically, therefore, the city is already
clothed with the right to divert the water.
As Parson, J., remarked, in Haupt's Ap-
peal, 125 Pa. 211, a bill by the borough of
Ashland against persons who were about
to abstract water from the stream, "We
have nothing to do with the rights of the
riparian owners below the plaintiff's dam.
If they have been injured [by the borough]
they have their claim to compensation, if
it has not already been made." [Of this
case Green, J., remarks, in Railroad Co. v.
Water Co. 182 Pa. 418, "we sustained an
injunction on the express ground that the
lower borough had acquired its rights by
an exercise of its right of eminent domain,
as well as by a purchase of theland."]
The city can as readily acquire the rights
of the upper land owner, the defendant,
as those of the lower land owner. It does
not follow that it may treat itself as having
already acquired these rights in order to
sustain this bill. It has given the defend-
ant no warning, prior to filing the bill, of
its intention to expropriate him. On the
contrary, its bill proceeds on the ground
that the defendant has not had the right
to do what he is doing on the land. Had
the plaintiff taken steps to have the rights
of the defendant condemned, its bill, in
defence of its own rights thus acquired,
would be sustained. Until then it is pre-
mature, so far as rights passing to it, as a
city, under the power of eminent domain
are concerned. As to its rights as a riparian
owner, the averments of the bill are not
sufficiently distinct and full to warrant a
decree.
Appeal dismissed.
MARY MAY vs. MILTON JONES.
Contract of marriage made on Sunday-
Action for breach thereof-Nature of
such contracts-Time of performance-
Sunday law.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
On the first Sunday of January, 1902,
the plaintiff entered into a contract of
marriage with the defendant.
The same day the'defendant determined
to leave the community; notified the plainn
tiff of the fact and signified his intention
not to marry her.
Since that time he has not seen her. She
brings this action to recover damages for
breach of promise.
DIVELY and BENjAmIN for the plaintiff.
The contract does not violate Act of As-
sembly of April 22, 1794. Love v. Nestut,
34 Pa. 409; Heckman v. Rosenthal, 20 C.
C. R. 512. A marriage contract made on
Sunday is not void if it is subsequently
recognized. Marklay v. Kessring, 2 Penn-
packer 187. Marriage being a civil con-
tract is not void on Sunday, 34 Pa. 409.
M OREHOUSE and FLEiTz for defendant.
Repudiation of a contract before perfor-
mance does not constituite a breach there-
114 THE FORUM
of. Standford v. Magill, 38 L. R. A. 760.
Plaintiff not having shown a failuke of
defendant to perform, cannot recover.
Daniels v. Weston, 114 Mass. 333; Pome-
roy v. Gold, 12 Metcalf 580. This promise
to marry is a violation of Act of Assembly
of April 22, 1794. Like all other civil con-
tracts, if made on Sunday, it is void.
Schuman v. Schuman, 3 Casey 90; Kep-
ner v. Keeper, 6 Watts 231; Fox v. NJensch,
3 N. & S. 444; Gangweri v. Estol, 2 Harris
425.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
The question before the court is whether
the evidence will support an action for
breach of a marriage contract, and in-
volves an inquiry into (1) the nature and
(2) the time of the agreement, since it
was executed on Sunday and the breach
occurred on the same day.
Generally speaking, the contract to
marry is a binding executory contract, the
performance of which is the assumption
of mutual marriage vows and consequent
status. The nutual promises given are
consideration of the highestorder, and the
contract is complete immediately upon
their communication and acceptance. And
it is not disputed that the contract between
Mary May and Milton Jones was complete,
for an adequate consideration, and bind-
ing, in the absence of special circum-
stances.
But it is pressed by counsel that the
action was brought prematurely. The
general rule, that "when .no time is fixed
for the performance of an executory con-
tract a reasonable time must be under-
stood," (Hare, J., in Nu rman v. Bourquin,
7 Phila. 239) applies to contracts of be-
trothal to marry, and "if no time is fixed
sgid agreed upon for the performance of
the contract, it is, in contemplation of law,
a contract to marry within a reasonable
period after request." (3 Addison Cont.
447; Caines v. Smith, 15 M. & W. 189.)
But here "the defendant determined to
leave the community; notified the plain-
tiff of the fact and signified his intention
not to marry her." After this- clear re-
nunciation, the rule of Lord Campbell in
Hochster v. De la Tour, 2 E. and B. 678, ap-
plies; the defendant is "precluded from
saying that he has not broken the contract
when he has declared that he entirely re-
nounced it, and "the plaintiff was not re-
quired to make a formal offer to perform
on her part before bringing suit." Mc-
Cormick v. Robb, 24 Pa. 47; see also, Knox-
berger v. Roiter, 91 Mo. 404; Wagonseller
v. Simmers, 97 Pa. 465; Burtis v. Thomp-
son, 42 N. Y. 246; Gough v. Farr, 12 C. L.
774. It is, therefore, certain, that, unless
void or voidable from being made on Sun-
day, the contract is binding, there was a
clear breach by the defendant, and the
plaintiff has a present right of action.
Whether a contract of engagement to
marry, entered into on Sunday and not
recognized or ratified on a subsequent week
day is binding, seems not to be squarely de-
cided in Pennsylvania. The cases cited
by counsel are not conclusive. In Mark-
ley v. Ressering, 2 Penny. 187, the facts
are nearly analogous but the evidence
showed a subsequent recognition of the
Sunday contract, and the court mentions
this as an element at least partially con-
trolling the opinion. In Fleishman v.
Rosenblatt, 20 C. C., there was also evi-
dence of subsequent recognition, though
no opinion is reported. In Com. v. Nes-
bit, 34 Pa. 409, Justice Lowrie says, "While
purely civil contracts are forbidden on
Sundays, marriage is not.so, because it is
not purely a civil, but also a religious con-
tract." Under the facts in that case this
was pure dictum.
In Gangwere's Estate, 14 Pa. 417, the
court was equally divided, and refused to
decide whether an ante-nuptial settlement
entered into on Sunday and immediately
before the ceremony of marriage was legal
though executed on Sunday. In the case
at bar, there was no "recognition" subse-
quently to bring the contract within the
rule of Markley v. Kessering and Fleish-
man v. Rosenblatt; neither does it provide
for property rights different from those
made by law concomitant to marriage, As
was the ease in Gaugwere's Estate.
To reach a conclusion in this case, itis
necessary to examine the wording of the
statute governing.
At common law the contract in question
would have been valid, for as Lord Mans-
field says in Drury v. Defontain, 1 Taunt.
135, "it does not appear that the common
law ever considered those contracts void
which were made on a Sunday." And
under the .statute of 29 Car. 11, (the law in
the Colony of Pennsylvania for sometime)
which forbids that all persons "shall do or
exercise any worldly labor, business, or
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work, of their ordinary callings upon the
Lord's day, ' the contract between Mary
May and Milton Jones would have been
binding. Drury v. Defontain, supra;
Bloom v. Richards, 2 Ohio S. 387; Adams
v. Gay, 19 Vt. 365.
The statutes of Pennsylvania, though
going somewhat further in enforcing a
Christian observance of Sunday, from the
first until 1794, all contained the ex-
ceptional phrase "of their ordinary call-
ings," and contracts of engggement to
marry were undoubtedly disposed of under
that phrase.
In the act of 1794, which is the law to-
day, and which reads "do or perform any
worldly employment or business whatso-
ever on the Lord's day," commonly called
Sunday, followed by'the usual exception
of works of charity and necessity, the
phrase, "of their ordinary callings" seems
to have been purposely omitted. The ques-
tion then, upon which we must pass in this
case is, whether a contract to marry, (like
the contract of sale passed upon by Lord
Mansfield in Drury v. Lafontain) and
valid before, became illegal after 1794, by
the omission of this phrase.
But it is not necessary to show that the
contract was a work of either necessity or
charity to make it an exception. Although
neither of these, if it can be excluded from
the terms "any worldly employment or
business," it is still one of the contracts
remaining as before the statutes, at com-
mon law.
The purpose of the statute of 1794 is, we
take it, primarily to protect Christian
people from being disturbed as to their
rest, and the observance of their religious
duties; and, secondly, to enforce the ob-
servance of Sunday as a holy day upon
which the performance of secular business
is wrong. And "worldly employment
and business include all that shocks the
moral sense from a Christian standpoint,
for Christianity is part of the law, and
whatever else may disturb the worship or
rest of the community. But there are
certain employments and certain con-
tracts, which, while neither necessary nor
charitable, yet are entirely proper to be
done on Sunday. These divide themselves
into two classes, one including such em-
ployment or business as is involved in, or
knit up with,, the religious observance of
the dlay, the other including employment
and busihess not involved in the observ-
atice of the day, and yet either accom-
panied by religious ceremonies, or else by
common consent regarded as of a moral
nature as opposed to worldly. Under the
first class is the work of the clergyman,
and that incident to reaching places of
public worship. Commonwealth v. Nesbit,
34 Pa. 409. Under the second class may
be mentioned perusals with the accom-
panying labor or business; also the making
of a will; (Butenman's Appeal, 55-Pa. 133);
also marriage, Bennet v. Brooke, 9 Allen.
118. The reason for the legality of this
latter class of acts is stated in Bennet v.
Brooke to be "because such an act does
not come within the category of trans-
actions which are connected with, or ap-
pertain to, ordinary worldly business."
And this reasoning includes the contract
of betrothal as well as the marriage proper.
Both are equally exceptional; the one is
but the consummation of the other ; and
the same solemnity and moral quality that
attaches to the one belongs to the other.
In Storch v. Griffin, 77 Pa. 504, the
court says of a contract to marry, "The re-
lation of which this contract was designed
to be the beginning, would, if consum-
mated, have affected the parties through-
out their lives. It is a relation on which
the most important rights of property-
social order and social morals-the whole
structure of our civilization indeed finally
rest."
The moral color of the betrothal con-
tract is also shown in the measure of dam-
ages for its breach; for it partakes of the
nature of a tort so much that the defend-
ant may be punished by the imposition of
vindictive damages (Baldy v. Smith, 11
Pa. 322) and before the statute of Feb. 24,
1834, the action for breach did not survive.
It is almost the invariable inception of a
relation which, by all the Christian world,
is regarded as of such a marked moral and
religious character as to be usually insti-
tuted by religious ceremonies (Gaugwere's
Estate, supra) and of such importance to
the welfare of humanity as to be especially
favored by the law. Scott v. Tyler, 2
head. Cases in Equity, 144.
Indeed, from no point of view can we
regard the solemn contract of betrothal,
nearly always to one contract of its kind
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in the life of an individual, so peculiarly
personal that its breach is more a tort than a
contractual wrong, so exceptionally moral
in its essence that its performance every-
where is partially given over to the super-
vision of the church, so important to the
state, that once performed the consequent
relation can be terminated, if at all, for a
few causes specifically set out by the legis-
lature, so commonly entered into on Sun-
day that by common usage it has never
been called worldly business. Such a con-
tract we feel certain was not within the
purpose of the legislature to be forbidden
as "worldly employment and business."
We, therefore, conclude that it is now as
it was at common law, a valid legal con-
tract whenever the proper, elements are
present, regardless of the time of its exe-
cution, and that the plaintiff, under the
evidence, has a right of action.
HoUcK, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
We affirm the judgment on the opinion
of the learned court below.
Judgment affirmed.
IN RE THOMPSON'S ESTATE.
Gift alleged after making of will-Decla-
rations of deceased in regard thereto,
not probable-Surcharge.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Henry Thompson made a will giving all
his estate (personalty) to his nephew,
Charles Thompson, and naming Charles
his executor. He subsequently made a
codicil, giving all his estate to the same
person, but naming testator's brother
William, executor. The day before making
the codicils, which were executed two
months after making the will, testator is
said to have determined to give half of his
estate to his brother John. He selected
securities, viz : shares of stock in the P. R.
R. and the P. & R. R. R., equal to of his
estate, and delivered the certificates to
John, with a blank power of attorney to
cause them to be transferred on the books
of the company. In distribution of the
estate, Charles denied the gift and claimed
to surcharge the executor with the value
of the securities taken by John. The wit-
nesses to support the gift were John and
William. Charles offered himself to prove
declarations of testator on the day of
writing the codicil both before and after
writing it to the effect that he still had all
the estate he had when he wrote the will.
John Rebuck was aldo offered to prove the
same declaration. The auditor rejected
all the evidence, and reported a surcharge.
Fox and DEVER for the plaintiff.
Death does not revoke a power of at-
torney, coupled with an interest. Hunt v.
Roumanier, 8 Wheaton 174; Lightner's
Appeal, 82 Pa. 801. Interested parties
may testify in favor of the estate. Yeakel
v. McAtee, 156 Pa. 600; Carpenter v. U. S.
Life Insurance Co., 161 Pa. 9; Brose's Es-
tate, 155 Pa. 619. Rebuck had no interest
and was therefore competent. Wolf v.
Carothers, 3 S. & R. 240; Tarr et al v. Rob-
insou et al, 158 Pa. 60; Dickinson V. Mc-
Gaw, 151 Pa. 98; Smith v. Hay, 152 Pa.
377.
COOPER and WALSH for the defendant.
John and William both have adverse
interests, and are incompetent. Act of
1887, clause e P. & L. Digest Col. 4835.
Adams v. Blakely, 20 W. N. C. 305: Parry
v. Parry, 180 Pa. 94; Spott' Estate, 156 Pa.
281 ; Irvin's Estate, 160 Pa. 82; Wolf v.
Wolf, 158 Pa. 621. The act of 1891 does
not apply. To constitute a valid gift inter
vivos, there must be an intention to make
a gift by words or acts. P. & L. Digest of
Decisions, column 2825, vol. 18; Collins v.
Collins, 2 Grant 117. A. & E. Ene. of
Law, vol. 14, page 1015.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
This case comes before this court on the
ground that certain evidence offered before
the auditor was excluded which should
have been admitted. The question was,
whether or not there had been a gift of
certain shares of stock, by Henry Thomp-
son, deceased, to his brother, John Thomp-
son. The parties offered were: Charles
Thompson, legatee under will of deceased;
John Rebuck, who from all that appears,
was a stranger, having no interest; Win.
Thompson, brother of the deceased and ex-
ecutor under the will, and John Thomp-
son, who claims the gift.
The transfer of the certificate of stock
with a blank power of attorney which was
held by John, does not ipso facto consti-
tute a valid gift. If the gift is shown to
have been made, then the blank power of
attorney would not bs 'revoked by the
death of the said Henry Thompson, for it
would clearly be a power coupled with an
interest. In the case of a power coupled
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with an interest, the power follows the es-
tate thus agreed to be transferred and be-
comes irrevocable by operation of law. If
the interest or the estate passes with the
power, and vests in the person by whom
the power is to be eiercised, such person
acts in his own name. If this be a gift,
John Thompson is no longer a substitute
acting in the name of another, but a
principal acting in his own name. Hunt
v. Roumanier, 8 Wheat. 174; Lightner's
Appeal, 82 Pa. 301.
The act of 1887, May 23rd, P. LJ. 158
See. 5, provides. "Nor when any party,
to a thing or contract in action is dead
* * * * and his right thereto or there-
in has passed, either by his own act, or
by the act of the law, to a party on the
record who represents his interest in the
subject in controversy, shall any surviving
or remaining party to such thing or con-
tract in action or any other person whose
interest shall be adverse to the said right of
the deceased, be a compentent witness to
any matter occurring before the death of
said party." In view of the above statute,
should the testimony offered, or any part.
thereof, have been received? We will ex-
amine separately the relation of each
party, offered, to the subject in contro-
versy.
"To exclude a witness," said Chie
Justice Gibson, in Wolf v. Carothers, 3 S.
& R. 240, "it is necessary that he should
have a vested interest, not in question,
but in the event of the suit. It must be
an interest that the judgment in the case
would operate upon ; for if by the event,
he would neither acquire or lose a right
nor incur a responsibility, which the law
recognizes, he is competent." The act of
1887, supra, made no change in the law as
then settled, but related solely to the
competency of interested as distinguished
from disinterested parties. Charles Re-
buck, we believe, was clearly cdmpetent
to testify. He not only had no interest,
adverse or otherwise, in the event of the
suit. He would neither acquire nor lose a
right which the law recognizes. Tarr et
al v. Robinson et a, 158 Pa 60; Dickinson
v. McGraw, 151 Pa. 98, and Smith v. Hay,
152 Pa. 377, have settled the construction
of the act of 1887 in accordance with this
view.
Authorities are numerous that inter-
ested parties may testify in favor of the
estate of the deceased. In Yeakel v. Mc-
Atee, 156 Pa. 600, McAtee was allowed to
testify to declarations and events which
took place before the death of Maria Cor-
son, since his testimony was in favor of
the estate, even though he was a legatee
under the will of the said Maria Corson.
"He was not adverse to the interest of the
deceased, but on the contrary he was
testifying for the estate." Carpenter v.
U. S. Life Insurance Co., 161 Pa. 9, and
Brose's Estate, 155 Pa. 619, are to the same
effect. Applying this principle to the case
under consideration, it is evident that the
testimony of Charles Thompson should
have been received, for manifestly he was
testifying in the interest of the estate of
the deceased party.
We now come to the testimony of Wil-
liam Thompson, the executor. Since
nothing appears in the statement of the
case which shows that William as execu-
tor has been negligent, and in consequence
of this negligence a surcharge might be
placed on him, we will presume that his
interest is only that of an executor. He
is therefore competent under section 4 of
the act of May 23, 1887, and Sheetz v. Han-
best's Executors, 81 Pa. 100.
In regards to John Thompson who
claims the gift, from all that appears he is
incompetent, for the reason that his testi-
mony would be adverse to that of the de-
ceased. If, however, John Rebuck was a
witness to the transaction by which John
Thompson secured the stock, and testifies,
then under the act of June 11, 1891, P. L.
287, the testimony of John Thompson
might be received.
The decree of the auditor, in view of
the above opinion must be reversed.
SHERBINE, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The exception made by the legatee,
Charles, to the account of the executor, is
that he has not charged himself with cer-
tain securities, equal in value to one-half
of th estAt-e.
The will of the decedent gives all his
estate to his nephew Charles, but names
his brother William the executor. After
the making of the will, it is alleged, the
gift of the securities to the testator's brother
John, took place. The testimony of John
and William, the brothers, was offered by
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William, the executor, to prove the gift.
The exceptant, Charles, offers himself to
prove a declaration by the testator, a day
after that on which the gift is said to have
been made, to the effect that he had not di-
minished his estate since writing the will.
John Rebuck is offered to prove the same
declaration. The auditor excluded all the
evidence, and recommends that the execu-
tor be surcharged. The executor excepts.
Were this an action against the executor,
by John, to recover the securities on the
ground that they had been sold or given
by the deceased to him, it is clear that he
would not support the sale or gift, by his
own testimony. Cf. Irwin's Estate, 160
Pa. 82. Nor could he, if this were a suit
by the executor against him, to recover
them or their value. The proceeding is
by the legatee against the executor, for
not recovering them, and accounting for
them. The legatee is the party to whom
primafacie the testator's right has passed,
subject to the executor's right of adminis-
tration. He can recover them only by
making the executor liable for them.
While, should William be surcharged,
he could not use. the decree as evidence, in
a subsequent suit against John; William
can not recover the securities from John
should the decree be favorable to him.
The legatee can obtain them only through
the executor, and should the executor suc-
ceed in this contest with the legatee, he
could not afterwards successfully allege
that the securities belonged to the estate,
and recover them. John therefore has an
interest adverse to the legatee, which his
own testimony would promote. He is
made incompetent by clause e. of section 5
of the act of May 23d, 1887.
If there had been such dealings between
John and William, that in no event could
the latter recover the securities from the
former, John would no longer be interest-
ed, and would probably be rendered com-
petent. But, no such dealings are shown
as would negative a right in William, as
executor, to maintain a suit for the securi-
ties, should William be compelled to ac-
count for them to the estate.
The proceeding is against the executor.
Is he competent to shield himself by prov-
ing a gift from the testator? The executor
is not, as such, forbidden to testify against
the alleged right of the decedent. Such
interest as he has, is against the claimant,
for the establishment of the claim would
lessen the corpus of the estate upon which
he would be entitled to commissions. If
this had been an action by John against
William, or by William against John for
the securities, William could have testified
against himself and for John, and thus
promoted, the recovery of a judgment in
favor of John. William could then have
used this judgment as a defence, if, in the
settlement of his account, an attempt had
been made, like the present, to surcharge
him.
But, it does not follow from the fact that
B can support A's right against a dead
man, before B acquires that right from A,
that he can support it after he has acquired
it. Thus, if A alleges that the decedent
sold- a horse to him and B is able to prove
the sale, B does not continue able to prove
it, in his own behalf, when he buys the
horse from A. Before he bought it he
might have supported the sale by his testi-
mony in a replevin by A against the execu-
tor of the decedent, or by the executor
against A, but, by buying the horse from
A, lie disqualifies himself.
When the executor pays a claim against
the dead man, or allows a claimant of
what had once been or is alleged to have
once been a part of the dead man's estate,
to keep it, he practically subrogates him-
self, so far as the owners of the estate are
concerned, to the claimant's position, and
he acquires the same adverse interest.
Any testimony subsequently given by
him, would be under the influence of that
interest. We are not able to adopt the
opinion of Ashman, J., in White's Estate,
13 Phila. 287. The auditor did right in
rejecting the testimony of William Thomp-
son.
It follows that the exception of the execu-
tor to the report of the auditor must be
dismissed.
The rejection of the testimony of Charles
Thompson, the legatee, and of John Re-
buck, has done the legatee no harm, and
it is unnecessary to consider whether it was
proper. We think, however, that it was
proper, not because the witnesses were not
competent, but because the content of their
testimony was not relevant. As the learned
court below shows, Charles Thompson was
offering to testify for, and not against the
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decedent. While the decedent's right to
deny and repudiate the alleged gift had
passed to him,he was not testifyingagainst.
but in support of, that right. .Rebuck
was a wholly disinterested witness, and
could have testified against, as well as for
the decedent, .but he was in fact testifying
for the decedent. But the subject of the
testimony was a. declaration made by the
deceased, after the alleged gift, in denial
of that gift. It is clear -that an -alleged
vendor, or grantor, or donor of real or per-
sonal property cannot impair the sale,
grant or gift, by subsequent deolarations.
A gift, once completed, can no more be
unmade by the denials of the donor, than
can a sale by the denials of the seller. Cf.
6 P. & L. Dig. Dec. 9694, 9704.
It follows, that the auditor correctly
found that there was no-gift oftthe-securi-
ties, and property surcharged-the.acconnt-
ant.
Decree reversed, with procedendo.
WALKER vs. THE-GREAT NORTH-
ERN RAILROAD.
Trepa s- ight of child to recover for
personal injuries inflicted before its
birth.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
The plaintiff's mother, ten days before
the birth of the plaintiff; was riding on
the defendant company's road, when, by
reason of the negligence of the company,
she was badly injured, which in time re-
sulted in the plaintiffbeing born a cripple.
The plaintiff, now, by his next friend or
guardian, brings this action in trespass
for damages sustained by him before birth.
It is contended that the plaintiff at the
time of the infliction of the injury was not
a person within the meaning of the law
allowing recovery in damages for negli-
gence.
VASTINE and WRIGHT for plaintiff.
A child, in the eyes of the law, comes
into existence at its conception. There
was such a contractual relation between
the child and defendant as to maintain
the action. Hall v. Hancock, 32 Mass.
255; 1 Blackstone 129.
PEIGHTEL and DELANEY for defendant.
The plaintiff was not a passenger in the
legal sense of the word. An infant before
birth has not such a separate existence
that an injury to him will sustain an ac-
tion after his birth. Pa. R_ R. Co. v. Puce,
96 Pa 267; Allen v. St. Luke's Hospital,
184 Ill. 359.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
The question involved in this case is,
had the plaintiff at the time of receiving
his alleged injuries such a distinct and in-
dependent existence that he may main-
tain the action, or was he in contempla-
tion of law a part of his mother?
In deciding this case, we find that there
is no statute on which the action can be
based, and if maintainable it must be so
by the common law which affords very
few precedents and there is absolutely no
authority in Pennsylvania law upon the
question involved.
At common law, any person who negli-
gently or wilfully did bodily harm to
another, was bound to compensate that
person for the injuries suffered. 1 Black-
stone 129, says: "The right of personal
security consists in a person's legal and
uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his
limbs, his body, his health and his repu-
tation. Life is a right inherent by nature
in every individual, and it begins in con-
templation of law as soon as an infant is
able to stir in the mother's womb. For if
a woman is quick with child and by a po-
tion or otherwise killeth it in her womb;
or if any one beat her, whereby the child
dieth in her body and she is delivered of a
dead child; this though not murder, was
by ancient law, homicide or manslaughter;
but if the child is born alive and after-
wards die in consequence of the potion or
beating, it will be murder." This doc-
trine is also recognized in our criminal
code of 1860 to an appreciable degree when
it makes the procuring or attempting to
procure an abortion a felony. This rule,
so firmly established by the criminal law,
certainly was not made merely for the
punishment of the wrongdoer and as a
prevention of crime; but was eqially as
much established for the protection of the
unborn child.
But not only has the criminal law
recognized the existence of an unborn
child. An infant in ventre sa mere is
supposed in law, to be born for many pur-
poses and should be for all beneficial pur-
poses to the child (Co. Litt. 36, 1 P. Wins.
329). An infant is in esse from~the time
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of conception for the purpose of taking an
estate which is for his benefit, whether by
descent, devise or under the statute of
distribution, provided the infant be born
alive and after such a period of foetal
existence that its continuance in life may
be reasonably expected. See 1 Bla. 129;
Hall v. Hancock, 32 Mass. 255: Pemberton
v. Parke, 5 Binney 601.
10 Amer. Eng. Cyc. 626, 1st Ed. cites
a case where a collision occurred at sea
whereby some of the crew drowned. The
court reserved leave to the child in ventre,
if born in due time to prefer a claim for
damages sustained by the death of the
father.
We thus see that a child in ventre is
recognized without statutory provision, in
the law of crime, law of real property,
admiralty law and also in equity. Is there
any good reason why it should not be
recognized in the law of torts. We fail to
see any legal principle which should jus-
tify the discrimination. And we think
the rule extremely harsh in a case where
the child has reached the advance stage
of foetal life when, if born prematurely, it
could independently exist. The doctrine
that a foetus is regarded as part of a
mother until it is born is not true in
theory and absolutely false in fact.
As before stated there are very few ad-
judicated cases upon this point, but our
attention has been called to several which
we shall now consider. In Dietrich v.
Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, decided in
1884, a mother when having been pregnant
for a period of four or five months, slipped
on a defect in a highway of the defendant
town, as the result of which she had a
miscarriage. The child lived for a few
minutes, but was too little advanced in
foetal life to survive its premature birth.
Its administrator brought an action un-
der a statute authorizing an action for
the benefit of the mother or next of kin.
It was held there could be no recovery.
In Walker v. Great Northern R. R. Co.
(decided in 1891) 48 L. R. A. 225, the
exact statement of facts seems to have
arisen as in the case at bar. A demurrer
was sustained to the plaintiff's statement
of claim because it did not show a con-
tractual relation between the plaintiffand
the R. R. Co., but merely averring a con-
tract between the R. R. Co. and plaintiffis
mother. The identical question involved
in the case at bar, was discussed by the
court with great learning. Mr. Chief Jus-
tice O'Brien after elaborating to a great ex-
tent, refused to commit himself. John-
son, J., held that the plaintiff was not
a person in legal contemplation. The
most recent authority we have had
the opportunity of examining is the
case of Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital,
(decided in 1900) 184 Ill. 359, the facts
being as follows: Plaintiff's mother
being pregnant, went to a lying-in hos-
pital for the treatment and care of
herself and child during her confinement
and until recovery. While there, she was
placed on an elevator which was negli-
gently operated by servants of the hospital,
causing her serious injuries, also result-
ing in the plaintiff being born deformed
and crippled for life. The trial and su-
preme court both refused to allow a re-
covery holding that a child previous to its
birth, is in fact a part of its mother and is
only severed from her at its birth. The
court goes on to say that if the action can
be maintained, it necessarily follows that
an infAnt may maintain an action against
its own mother for injuries occasioned by
the negligence of the mother while preg-
nant.
This case goes further than Walker v.
R. R. Co. supra, for in the latter case a re-
covery was refused for the reason that
there was no contract on behalf of the
plaintiff, but in Allaire v. Hospital, the
care of the child was expressly contracted
for. The doctrine of both these cases is
affirmed in the recent decision of Gorman
v. Bodlong, 49 Alt. Rep. 704 (R. I.) These
ddcisions must therefore be taken as set-
tling the rule that birth fixes the precise
point at which existence of a persm be-
gins. If then a child, who is permanent-
ly injured a moment before its birth by a
careless accoucheur or even by an inten-
tional wrongdoer, is to have a remedy it
must be on some other ground. The diffi.
cult question of proving the cause of the
injury has been strenuously argued and
carries with it some weight, for to recog-
nize a right of this sort, it has been said
might incline the mother to romancing
and the jury to superstition. With due
deference to the doctrine of Stare decisis,
we enter judgment for the defendant.
GRoss, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
Affirmed on opinion of learned court
below.
